0MyOrigo
MyDevice
Announced
2002
Weight
168 grams
Features
The MyDevice is a rare early example of a smartphone. It was conceived and designed by Johannes Väänänen and Jukka-Pekka Metsävainio who was the co-innovator cited on many of the key patents for the phone. He was the co-innovator in most of the main patents. is regarded by some as the world's first touchscreen smartphone that did not use a stylus. At the time, devices controlled by swiping a finger across the screen were not yet a reality. Early touch-screen devices, primarily handheld personal digital assistants (PDAs), used a stylus to interact with the screen. Internet services were in their infancy with rudimentary access to content using simple technologies such as the wireless application protocol (WAP).
Väänänen had developed an early prototype of the device and agreed to a partnership with contract manufacturer Microcell and its founder Jyrki Hallikainen. A subsidiary, MyOrigo, was formed to develop the MyDevice phone and quickly had over 100 employees. The first prototype was completed in early 2002 and offered a product with Internet browsing and downloadable apps.
The device was powered by a Java-based operating system called Intent which was created by a company called Tao. Although the hardware developed by MyOrigo was excellent, the software underpinning the device was equally as important. At the time, existing software platforms and chipsets were too slow to drive a phone with the demands of MyOrigo, however Tao's Intent was architected to overcome these limitations.
Navigating a web page was done using a capability that MyOrigo called “mirroring” – as a user moved the phone left, right, up or down the screen would move accordingly. MyOrigo called it “mirroring” because the experience was similar to looking into a hand mirror. If you looked straight at the device you could see your face Straight on, you can see your face. If the device was tilted a web page would scroll from side to side and up and down.
Furthermore, although now a default feature on all devices, the MyDevice was able to switch an image, web page or other content from portrait to landscape by tipping the phone on its side. This was considered quite revolutionary when the product was conceived.
Rotating image picture created by Anna-Leena Hartojoki who was the Design Manager at My Origo between 2001 and 2004
Key technical specs for the device included a custom designed 176 x 320 16-bit colour TFT LCD display manufactured by Philips and a built-in VGA camera. It was powered by an Intel StrongARM SA-1100 32-bit ARM RISC processor running at 133/190 MHz. The moulds for the phone were made byFerbeGivab in Gothenburg, Sweden.
On completing the prototype, MyOrigo and Väänänen pitched the MyDevice to all the leading players in the mobile phone industry including Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, Philips, Samsung, Siemens and others. The device got a positive reception but it proved hard to get anyone to commit to buy the product.
Notably, in his book, The Smart Device, Väänänen recalls that MyOrigo visited Apple in California to demonstrate the MyDevice. During the meeting, Steve Jobs walked into the room and tried the product showing a particular interest in browsing. Väänänen feels that this had a heavy influence on what the iPhone would eventually become.
Having failed to sell the device as a near-finished prototype product a new company, F-Origin, was created with some of the original development team and the related patents. They sought to sell the technology, notably the user interface developments, which included finger touch control and web browsing capabilities. Samsung showed interest in working with F-Origin to build a product and provided some investment that kept the company going. The first in-person meeting in Oulu, Finland was very successful, but the follow-up meeting was a disaster. F-Origin had defaulted on its rent and found its offices locked when they arrived to let the Samsung delegation into the building for a meeting. Unable to enter, the Samsung team left never to return. Samsung ended its funding.
This resulted in a rapid decline for the company and its eventual bankruptcy in 2005. The administrators took control of the assets and sold the related software and patents to a US entity for €300,000.
The device in the Mobile Phone Museum collection was donated by Carl-Gustav Lindén (who has written an interesting book about Nokia). He purchased a batch of eight MyDevice phones via an online site. Apparently, the seller had “found them outside the factory”.
One additional story that emerged during our research on this device came from Francis Charig who worked for Tao, the company that provided the Intent operating system for the device. He was involved in the negotiations with Samsung in Korea together with Tao colleague Martin Gossling. They were warned by friends experienced in dealing with Samsung that if they were staying in the Hotel Shilla, a Samsung hotel, they should be careful of what they discussed in their rooms. On this basis, they did not discuss the forthcoming negotiations at all after landing in Seoul. When they got to Samsung's offices the following morning, the tactics used were for two Samsung negotiators to tell the Tao team what the deal was, give them a specified number of minutes to come to a conclusion and then leave the room. This process was repeated throughout the morning. Every time the negotiators left the room the Tao team assumed that they were being listened to, considering this was the safest policy. Whenever the Tao team were left alone to ponder the Korean demands, one of them would say, “Well, that will be our response” and the negotiators would immediately walk through the door. At one point when on their own, Francis said to Martin, “If we are negotiated under $1.50 for each handset, then we walk because we know LG will pay that.” Unbeknownst to Samsung, Tao hadn’t ever spoken to LG. When the Samsung negotiators returned, they agreed to a price of $1.50 per device for the Tao software which was actually three times the budgeted price Tao has been working with. Ultimately this made little difference as the MyOrigo device never reached the market. Had it been successful it could have been a game-changer for Tao.
Rotating image picture created by Anna-Leena Hartojoki who was the Design Manager at My Origo between 2001 and 2004
Key technical specs for the device included a custom designed 176 x 320 16-bit colour TFT LCD display manufactured by Philips and a built-in VGA camera. It was powered by an Intel StrongARM SA-1100 32-bit ARM RISC processor running at 133/190 MHz. The moulds for the phone were made byFerbeGivab in Gothenburg, Sweden.
On completing the prototype, MyOrigo and Väänänen pitched the MyDevice to all the leading players in the mobile phone industry including Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, Philips, Samsung, Siemens and others. The device got a positive reception but it proved hard to get anyone to commit to buy the product.
Notably, in his book, The Smart Device, Väänänen recalls that MyOrigo visited Apple in California to demonstrate the MyDevice. During the meeting, Steve Jobs walked into the room and tried the product showing a particular interest in browsing. Väänänen feels that this had a heavy influence on what the iPhone would eventually become.
Having failed to sell the device as a near-finished prototype product a new company, F-Origin, was created with some of the original development team and the related patents. They sought to sell the technology, notably the user interface developments, which included finger touch control and web browsing capabilities. Samsung showed interest in working with F-Origin to build a product and provided some investment that kept the company going. The first in-person meeting in Oulu, Finland was very successful, but the follow-up meeting was a disaster. F-Origin had defaulted on its rent and found its offices locked when they arrived to let the Samsung delegation into the building for a meeting. Unable to enter, the Samsung team left never to return. Samsung ended its funding.
This resulted in a rapid decline for the company and its eventual bankruptcy in 2005. The administrators took control of the assets and sold the related software and patents to a US entity for €300,000.
The device in the Mobile Phone Museum collection was donated by Carl-Gustav Lindén (who has written an interesting book about Nokia). He purchased a batch of eight MyDevice phones via an online site. Apparently, the seller had “found them outside the factory”.
One additional story that emerged during our research on this device came from Francis Charig who worked for Tao, the company that provided the Intent operating system for the device. He was involved in the negotiations with Samsung in Korea together with Tao colleague Martin Gossling. They were warned by friends experienced in dealing with Samsung that if they were staying in the Hotel Shilla, a Samsung hotel, they should be careful of what they discussed in their rooms. On this basis, they did not discuss the forthcoming negotiations at all after landing in Seoul. When they got to Samsung's offices the following morning, the tactics used were for two Samsung negotiators to tell the Tao team what the deal was, give them a specified number of minutes to come to a conclusion and then leave the room. This process was repeated throughout the morning. Every time the negotiators left the room the Tao team assumed that they were being listened to, considering this was the safest policy. Whenever the Tao team were left alone to ponder the Korean demands, one of them would say, “Well, that will be our response” and the negotiators would immediately walk through the door. At one point when on their own, Francis said to Martin, “If we are negotiated under $1.50 for each handset, then we walk because we know LG will pay that.” Unbeknownst to Samsung, Tao hadn’t ever spoken to LG. When the Samsung negotiators returned, they agreed to a price of $1.50 per device for the Tao software which was actually three times the budgeted price Tao has been working with. Ultimately this made little difference as the MyOrigo device never reached the market. Had it been successful it could have been a game-changer for Tao.
Documentation
